do not have the same explicit democratization aspect that is associated with vetting. 19 To the extent that intentions influence outcomes, there is a potential difference in each measure's ability to build trust, support democracy and promote peace. While there is a gray area in 13 This differentiation is stressed in the UN's Operational Handbook and the UNDP's Operational Guidelines, presumably both as a proscriptive as well as a policy prescriptive. 14 UN (2006) 4. 15 UN (2006) ; Moira Lynch, 'Purges,' in Lavinia Stan and Nadya Nedelsky (eds) . Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice (CUP 2013) 61. 16 Duthie, in Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff (2007) 18. 17 Lynch in Stan and Nedelsky (2013) (CUP 1996) . Lynch highlights the potential retributive aspects in Stan and Nedelsky (2013) . 19 Nalepa, in Stan and Nedelsky (2013) 47. to the process, in addition to judicial appeal options and oversight mechanisms. 24 In other words, vetting procedures can be shaped to fit a diverse array of justice needs and state resource constraints.
While the vetting of public institutions could encompass a range of sectors at various levels within the government hierarchy, the security and justice sectors are often listed as vetting priorities. The UN suggests that vetting programs 'should prioritize the military, the civilian security sector, intelligence services, the judiciary, and other institutions that underpin the rule of law,' such as the police. 25 Vetting is regularly including as one Security
Sector Reform (SSR) measure and/or as an institutional reform measure in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into society (DDR) programs. 26 For example, vetting in El Salvador targeted the armed forces, the police and the judiciary, vetting in Liberia similarly focused on security sector reforms after two civil wars, and vetting in Bosnia also concentrated on security related sectors.
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Vetting is also possible in a variety of institutional and cultural settings, and has been enacted in both post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts. Elster documents examples of vetting after WWII in Belgium, Japan, Germany, Austria, France, Hungary, Norway, and
Holland. 28 Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff present cases of vetting across Europe (Greece), Eastern Europe (Hungary and Poland) , and Latin America (Argentina and El Salvador),
analyzing both post-conflict and post-authoritarian cases in comparative perspective. Greiff (2007) 180. 28 Elster (2004) . It is of note that some of the scope conditions in these cases might be placed in a gray zone between purges and vetting programs. 29 Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff (2007) .
Fithen similarly compares vetting in Bosnia, Liberia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, despite the significant differences across the cases. 30 The range of cases speaks to the potential flexibility of this form of transitional justice, hinting at one of the reasons it has been so widely embraced as a tool of institutional reform.
Vetting is compatible with the use of trials (Bosnia), truth commissions (South Africa), and former combatant reintegration programs (Liberia), to name a few examples of the use of multiple transitional justice measures. 31 The pairing of vetting with other types of personnel reforms or accountability measures might improve the efficacy of vetting and the accompanying measures. Mayer-Rieckh suggested that 'as a stand-alone measure, vetting is generally insufficient to ensure that abuses are not repeated.' 32 Whether vetting alone or combined with measures yields the most effective outcomes remains an empirical question for impact assessments, but Mayer-Rieckh's suggestion highlights the need for attention to the efficacy of measures both individually and combined with other reforms.
Operational challenges
As with other forms of transitional justice, vetting relies on the availability and quality of information. Unfortunately in many post-conflict and post-authoritarian environments, the veracity of information compiled by the previous regime might be dubious. For example, many have questioned the reliability of the communist secret police files due to the known tendency for the inclusion of falsified information in the files, as well as problems with selective file destruction on the eve of the regime change. on incomplete or flawed information could result in biased transitional justice processes, and therefore fail to achieve trust-building goals. Moreover, the process of vetting requires significant financial resources, especially if impartial committees are tasked with compiling and reviewing thousands of files. In many transitional environments, there are significant resource limitations and a plethora of state (re)building demands on those resources. The costs of transitional justice pose operational hurdles to effective implementation.
There are challenges and potential weaknesses in the design and implementation of vetting that go beyond the typical information or financial constraints inherent in many transitional justice measures. First, vetting necessarily removes individuals from positions.
The assumption is that those individuals lack the integrity and/or the capacity to effectively execute their job in keeping with the new goals of the regime. However, in many transitional environments there is a dearth of personnel qualified to staff public offices and bureaucracies. justice strategy.' 38 The extent to which vetting can actually achieve trust building and democracy promotion remains an empirical question because it rests partially on the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the programs and partially on the complexity of any given post-authoritarian or post-conflict transition environment. Impact assessment issues will be raised in the last section of this piece but to preview the findings, the results are mixed.
Lustration
The In sum, lustration in the context of the post-communist transitions was (and is) understood as a transitional justice process that authorizes legally constrained government actions against individuals who were complicit with the previous communist regime, defined in terms of secret police affiliation, secret police collaboration, active abetting of the communist regime, and/or possible Communist Party affiliations. The legal mandates and constraints on lustration distinguish it definitionally from purges, although in practice some critics have accused lustration of careening into the realm of extra-legal purges. 57 The government action could include soliciting information about individuals, investigating said individuals, trying and disqualifying those individuals from public, semi-public, and social positions of trust, making information about complicity accessible, and/or publicly disclosing information about certain individuals. A number of transition goals have been ascribed to lustration policies, including to make public institutions more trustworthy, to improve the trustworthiness of government, to rebuild the state, to reduce corruption, and to support societal reconciliation. As with vetting, lustration aims to support the process of democratization in transitional societies.
Rule of law concerns
Lustration has come under fire from academics, legal scholars and policy practitioners because of the potential and actual rule of law violations in the design and implementation of the measures. 58 Removing individuals from public office or publicly releasing damaging information about individuals on the basis of previous regime affiliations and behaviors could violate individual liberties and legal protections. Screening not on individual criteria but on broad communist party affiliations and communist era relationships of necessity might 57 Nalepa highlights differences between lustration and purges in Stan and Nedelsky (2013 Opponents of lustration argue that if a new government is willing to transgress rule of law guidelines in order to pursue justice, this could signal a lack of commitment to the process of democratization.
Even if lustration was not legally questionable, the methods might undermine rather than enhance the transitions. On moral grounds, some contend that lustration amounts to a purge, evoking the unfair and personalistic purges of the Stalinist era and previous communist regimes. 60 Others question the validity of a policy that bases integrity assessments on the contents of secret police files. The veracity of the files has been routinely questioned, since there was an incentive on the part of both secret police agents and informers to falsify information. Many files are missing or were destroyed, limiting the ability to conduct a full lustration process and potentially biasing results. The use of the ill-gotten secret police files as a mechanism to create a new democracy has struck many critics as both inappropriate and possibly counterproductive.
61
The broader scope of lustration into social spheres and the extended time frame over which lustration has been implemented generated additional concerns about the legality and appropriateness of lustration measures as used in the post-communist cases. For example, the Boed (1999) . Lustration is often pejoratively described in the press as a purge to connote problems with the political manipulation of the laws. See BBC, 'Weekly warns "purges" in secret services rendering Poland "defenceless",' (2007) Additionally, lustration might undermine rather than enhance the trust building.
Revelations about the scope of the interpersonal betrayals under the previous regime by neighbors, relatives and co-workers might undermine societal trust, irrespective of its effects on the trustworthiness of public institutions. There is also a potential to decrease institutional trust, should citizens recoil from current office holders with histories of complicity with the secret police. There is the additional danger that the files and information could be politically manipulated, thereby tainting the overall process and undermining trust in government, political parties and agents of the government. 62 The many potential problems and adverse consequences associated with the process led several prominent dissident voices to call for a thick line to be drawn between the past and the present in order to avoid these dilemmas altogether.
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International courts, domestic courts, international organizations and nongovernmental organizations examined aspects of lustration for potential or actual rule of law violations. In particular, concerns about information veracity problems, potential due process violations, employment discrimination dangers, and bureaucratic loyalty concerns motivated examinations of the legality of both the design and appropriateness of the measures. 64 The
International Labour Organization (ILO) heard cases addressing the potential legal problems associated with lustration and criticized aspects of the measures for violating fair employment 62 Stan (2006) . 63 Michnik and Havel (1993) . 64 practices. 65 The Helsinki Committee also questioned the potential excesses of lustration, suggesting some variants of the measures could violate human rights and individual liberties. 66 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) heard a number of legal challenges to lustration. While many of the ECHR rulings cautioned about the potential for misuse of lustration and the importance of following due process and rule of law procedures, the ECHR has consistently upheld a state's right to use lustration to make assessments about the political loyalty of its bureaucracy in order to uphold and defend its democratic principles. 67 In fact, the ECHR rulings framed lustration as a potential democracy safeguard for transitional states.
The international rulings conferred legitimacy on the authenticity of the motives for lustration, and reaffirmed the legality of lustration in design. National courts in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic, Poland and Latvia, similarly ruled in favor of the legality of lustration measures and described the rationale for lustration as a means of democracy protection and promotion. /1991 / /14,' in Kritz (ed. trans.1995 personnel reform of public institutions and penetrated more deeply into social institutions and semi-public spheres. The expanded scope, retroactive nature, long duration, and employment criteria that include potential collective culpability components have catalyzed more criticism than traditional vetting measures for potential and actual rule of law derogations. 69 Despite the legal challenges, the laws continue to be implemented in many countries in Central and
Eastern Europe and as such remain potential templates for extra-regional lustration programs in other post-authoritarian transitions.
Definitional, Measurement and Assessment Challenges
The terms vetting, lustration, screening, and even purges are sometimes used interchangeably to describe country cases, blurring and reconfiguring definitional distinctions between them over time. 70 For example, Elster's edited volume on retributive justice adopts a relatively high definitional level of abstraction, describing most vetting procedures under the umbrella term purges. 71 McAdams' edited volume on transitional justice in new democracies has no index item for vetting at all, using terms like purges, lustration and decommunization to describe policies in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic instead. 72 A decade later, described as a type of screening law or vetting law and then gradually became emblematic of lustration laws. 74 Sometimes there is a normative connotation embedded in the choice of a definition or word, in the way that architects of lustration framed the screening practices as bound by rule of law in order to differentiate them from the extra-legal purges prevalent under communism. 75 Other times the level of abstraction adopted by the author affects the definitional umbrellas employed. The definitional fluidity highlights the familial resemblance across the measures, but it also creates some confusion regarding how to consistently label and assess country cases. 76 Definitions matter to the extent that policy prescriptions, warnings and caveats are derived from the actual performance of vetting or lustration measures.
Definitional distinctions affect coding decisions with resulting policy implications.
For example, the Transitional Justice Database project has compiled an impressive array of country cases across five types of transitional justice. 77 In classifying transitional justice measures, the database compresses all cases of purges, vetting and lustration together, and codes them all as 'lustration.' In practice, this means the case of Sudan in 1985 to remove coup plotters, a case against six army officers in Indonesia in 1992, the case of Bosnia in 1995 involving war criminals, and the Czech Republic's decades long lustration policies against secret police informers are all coded in exactly the same way as lustration measures.
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Conclusions drawn about the relationships between lustration and outcomes must be interpreted in light of these definitional and coding decisions.
There are measurement challenges to also consider in thinking about coding cases and assessing impact. It is not simply the presence or absence of vetting or lustration that matters, but the quality and implementation of the program. Statistical analyses using bivariate measures-presence or absence of lustration--to explore correlations between transitional justice and transition goals like trust building, democracy, promotion, adherence to human rights, or peace, would gloss over differences in the quality of programs. In order to better understand the impact of transitional justice in general, and vetting and lustration more specifically, we need to be able to conceptualize and operationalize differences across cases with reasonably consistent inter-coder reliability.
Advances in the assessment of the conditions under which transitional justice measures are able to support a range of transition goals partially depend on our collective ability to address some of these aforementioned measurement and definitional issues.
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While the vast majority of studies refrain from drawing conclusions about the efficacy of vetting measures, initial impact testing has generated mixed results with some studies supporting and others refuting the alleged benefits of vetting. new problems. 82 Fithen argued, 'The legacy is profoundly negative and undermines efforts to instill objective, impartial procedures to strengthen integrity and professionalism.' 83 The vetting of the judiciary in Bosnia was viewed more positively, with observed improvements in public perceptions of the judiciary and the prosecutorial office. 84 The vetting of the judiciary and the police in Liberia did not yield the hoped for changes, and the security sector reforms were even associated with new problems. 85 The vetting in Iraq as part of the DeBa'athification program was widely assessed as a failure, leaving negative legacies that undermined reconciliation. 86 Since we lack counter-factual evidence, we cannot say with certainty if things would have been better or worse in the absence of reforms in any of these cases. While these examples are too limited to draw conclusions about the efficacy of vetting as a form of transitional justice, they do elucidate some of the challenges involved in assessing the overall impact of vetting from single cases.
In the case of lustration policies in post-communist countries, preliminary analyses of lustration's effects on trust-building and democracy have also yielded mixed results. There is some indication that lustration has supported trustworthy public institutions and contributed positively to democratization across the region. 87 It is also possible that certain types of trust could be enhanced and other types of trust undermined by revelations of regime complicity among the population, suggesting even more nuance is necessary in assessing the possible divergent effects of lustration measures. 88 However, the many examples of problems with lustration in certain countries raise questions about the utility or disutility of lustration in specific national contexts. 89 Finally, the manner in which lustration has been extended, amended, repurposed and instrumentalized engenders reasonable temporal concerns now that the region has passed the twenty fifth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. These questions can only be explored systematically if the transitional justice community is better able to classify cases and link the cases to outcomes.
Conclusion
Vetting and lustration are both types of transitional justice that include personnel reforms and institutional change mechanisms. They both assess the integrity and capabilities of individuals in positions of power and public trust broadly defined. Both vetting and lustration strive to support transitional states by building more trust in public institutions, promoting trust in government, upholding rule of law practices, facilitating adherence to human rights, and supporting democracy.
Despite their familial resemblance, there are differences between typical vetting programs and lustration programs in the scope, depth, and duration of the measures that bear continued consideration in the literature on transitional justice. To move forward with impact assessments, the field of transitional justice will need to conceptualize and operationalize measures like vetting, purges and lustration, in a manner that highlights their similarities and differences. Continued attention to the conceptual differences will facilitate the cumulation of knowledge about the conditions under which the measures are able to support transitional regime goals.
Neil Kritz recently assessed the state of our knowledge regarding vetting and lustration measures:
Noncriminal sanctions, such as purges, lustration, and public access to security files, are a critical piece of transitional justice programs and have been featured in one combination or another, in almost every transitional justice case, yet they continue to get short shrift in the research literature… They are more important for the democratic reform element and arguably for the peacebuilding element. Research must evaluate how effective these efforts have been. 
